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Embodied Cognition as Analog Computation 
Alistair M. C. Isaac 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Embodied, enactive cognitive science has traditionally rejected computationalism and 
its compatriot, representationalism.  I argue that this rejection is too hasty, and places 
undo weight on intuitions about simple dynamical systems, such as the Watt 
Governor.  I suggest instead that enactivists should consider cognition analogous to 
more complex, functional dynamical systems, such as analog computers, offering in 
particular a hydrodynamic computer, the MONIAC, as a new metaphor for 
embodied cognitive science.  The implication of this approach is that adequate 
explanations of embodied cognition will require both the construction of models and 
the identification of representations.  
 
 
§1. Introduction 
 
Computationalism is the view that brains (and/or minds) are analogous to computers, 
and consequently the language and concepts of computer science provide a basic 
framework within which to construct psychological explanations.  The fundamental 
implication of this analogy is that cognition comprises sequences of transformations 
over representations.1  When this perspective first arose in the latter half of the 20th 
century, it contributed to the emergence of cognitive science as an integrated research 
program by facilitating communication across disciplinary boundaries—psychologists, 
neuroscientists, computer scientists, and philosophers could share ideas and debates 
by framing them in the language of computation.  This communicative value in part 
explains why radical alternatives to the traditional perspective, such as connectionism 
or Bayesianism, are typically presented within the broad framework of 
computationalism. 
 Nevertheless, a growing nexus of related, high-level paradigms within 
cognitive science explicitly reject computationalism.  A locus classicus for this rejection 
is van Gelder’s (1995) “What might cognition be, if not computation?”  Van Gelder 
argued that the dynamical systems approach to cognitive science suggests a new 
explanatory paradigm, requiring neither computation nor representation, yet able to 
provide deep understanding of the mechanisms of cognition.  This challenge to 
computationalism has been echoed more recently in the work of the “multi-E” 																																																								1	A recent trend in philosophy of computation argues that computations may be identified and their 
vehicles individuated through mechanistic analysis that makes no appeal to “representations” (Piccinini, 
2008, 2015; Dewhurst, 2016; Schweizer, 2017).  My point here is not about individuation, but 
constitution: the objects transformed during a computation are bearers of content, a presupposition of 
the mathematical theory of computation and all its results.  This does not rule out the possibility of 
content-ignorant individuation of computations, but it does rule out the coherence, or at least 
relevance, of content-absent computational theories.  Ironically, Piccinini himself seems to concede this 
point when granting that an “internal semantics” for computational vehicles follows from analysis of 
their functional role (2008, 135–6, 173–5; c.f. Isaac, forthcoming).  The explanatory value of 
representation identification in analog computers is addressed explicitly in §3; those whose 
representation-phobia is still undamped by this discussion may seek solace in Miłkowski, 2015.	
cognition movement, which emphasises the embodied, embedded, extended, and/or 
enactive nature of cognition;2 Hutto and Myin (2013), for instance, explicitly reject 
both computationalism and representationalism.  A somewhat more temperate 
viewpoint pays lip-service to computationalism, while rejecting the explanatory value 
of representations (Chemero, 2009; Villalobos and Dewhurst, 2017). 
 The purpose of this paper is to suggest that the shift to a dynamical, 
embodied, or enactive perspective does not obviate the computational metaphor.  
Rather, embodiment considerations imply that analog, rather than digital, 
computation is the appropriate model for explaining cognition.  I argue that this point 
has been obscured by an undue focus in the dynamic cognition literature on the overly 
simplistic example of the Watt Governor (§2).  I suggest instead the MONIAC, a 
hydraulic model of macroeconomic cash flow, as a new exemplar for computation in a 
dynamical system.  Once we accept the MONIAC as a metaphor for embodied, 
enactive cognition, we see that the enactivist rejection of representationalism is 
misguided—pace Piccinini and Dewhurst, computation is constitutively the 
manipulation of representations; moreover, pace Chemero and Hutto, identification of 
representations in dynamical cognitive systems does substantive explanatory work 
(§3).  Nevertheless, taking cognition to be analog computation does have novel 
implications, suggesting that representations are kinematic patterns rather than static 
symbols; dynamical explanations constitutively require simulations; and only robust, 
replicable neural processes are properly cognitive (§4).   
 
§2. Dynamics and anti-computationalism: The Watt Governor 
 
Enactive cognitive science emphasizes the role of dynamic interactions between brain, 
body, and environment in generating the complex behavior we identify with cognition 
(Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, 1991; Ward, Silverman, and Villalobos, 2017).  By 
placing emphasis on these dynamic interactions, enactivism makes a radical break 
with the traditional, mid-20th century, research program in cognitive science, which 
focused on static representations, transformed in discrete time steps by syntactically 
specified rewrite rules, in an environment encapsulated from the world, such as the 
interior of a computer (or a brain).  Enactivism replaces this static and discrete model 
with one on which the mathematics of cognition is that of dynamical systems theory, 
cognitive transformations are continuous, best described by differential equations 
rather than rewrite rules, and these equations may only be interpreted by assigning 
some variable values to quantities in the environment.  Thus, questions about whether 
enactive cognition involves representation or computation turn directly on the 
appropriate interpretation of the mathematics of dynamical systems in the context of 
cognitive science. 
 Van Gelder (1995) defends the claim that dynamical systems models of 
cognition need not appeal to representation, a fortiori computation, through a detailed 
discussion of the Watt Governor.  This ingenious device, invented by James Watt in 
1788, used the centrifugal force of spinning weights to regulate the flow of energy in 																																																								2	Multi-E cognitive science comprises a multitude of distinct research programs, not all of which are 
mutually compatible (Rowlands, 2009; Wheeler, 2017).  Here, I coarsely group enactive and embodied 
tendencies on the grounds they are largely united in their rejection of computationalism, with the 
understanding that more nuanced distinctions are possible, and that not all within this tradition do 
explicitly reject the computational metaphor.	
early steam engines.  The problem is to ensure constant speed of a flywheel driven by 
the engine, and itself driving some further mechanism (wheels, loom, pile driver, etc.); 
the challenge is that the flow of steam from the engine fluctuates randomly, as does 
the consumption of energy, due to variance in task demands.  For instance, if a steam 
train is to maintain constant speed while going over uneven terrain, the supply of 
energy must fluctuate up as hills are climbed and down as valleys are entered.  Watt’s 
solution was to establish a dynamical feedback loop between spinning weights driven 
by the flywheel and the flow of steam from the engine: as the weights’ rate of spin 
goes up, the increasing centrifugal force pushes a lever closing a valve regulating the 
flow of steam; as their rate of spin decreases, the reverse occurs, and the drop in the 
weights’ rate of spin releases the valve, allowing greater flow of steam.  Consequently, 
the dynamic interaction between spinning weights and valve ensures flow of steam 
(and thus energy) maintain the desired equilibrium (Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  The Watt Governor. 
 
 In discussing this example, van Gelder contrasts it with an obvious (digital) 
computational solution to the same problem.  A modern computer might regulate 
flow by (i) measuring and representing current quantity of steam; (ii) measuring and 
representing current speed of flywheel; (iii) representing desired speed of flywheel; (iv) 
performing a calculation to determine change in quantity of steam required to achieve 
desired speed from current; and only then (v) adjusting valve to change flow of steam.  
This analysis fits the computational paradigm: it stipulates a set of relevant 
representations (current speed, desired speed, etc.) and transformation over them, 
calculating the degree to which the valve must be adjusted by applying rules to the 
represented values.   
 Van Gelder takes representation and computation to be “mutually 
interdependent” properties (351), and thus, if the Watt Governor is not 
representational, it is inappropriate to describe it as computational. Yet the parts of 
the Watt Governor do not in any straightforward sense represent values of the sort 
found in the computational analysis of its task.  The angle of the arms, for instance, 
might at first seem to represent engine speed; yet arm angle and engine speed are only 
directly correlated when the system is in stable equilibrium, while it is precisely when 
the system is out of equilibrium that the governor performs its function, dynamically 
adjusting steam flow toward the target (352–3). 
 A more important reason to reject analysis of the Watt Governor as 
computational or representational is that an effective description of its behavior—
either the qualitative one above, or a more rigorous one provided by the differential 
equations it satisfies—does not appeal to representations or their transformation.  
Appeal to representation in explaining the Governor would be explanatorily idle: 
“representation is just the wrong sort of conceptual tool to apply” (353).  This is the 
essential claim that later advocates of the dynamical perspective have emphasized: 
even if “a representational gloss is possible, once one has the dynamical explanation, 
the representational gloss does not predict anything about the system’s behavior that 
could not be predicted by the dynamical explanation alone” (Chemero, 2000, 638). 
 Since van Gelder, the Watt Governor, and the question of whether or not it is 
representational, has been extensively discussed in the literature on embodied 
cognition (Chemero, 2009, 68–71; Shapiro, 2010, 119–25, 144–9; Hutto and Myin, 
2013, 59–63).  However, this discussion is relevant to cognitive science only if we 
accept that the Watt Governor serves as an adequate metaphor for embodied 
cognitive processes.  Yet there is good reason to doubt this adequacy, namely the 
sheer simplicity of the Watt Governor: its internal behavior varies along a single 
functional dimension—height of weights while spinning—, as does its output 
behavior—opening or closing a valve.  In contrast, complex cognitive behavior 
exhibits many dimensions of variance—uttering a sentence, ascribing a motivational 
state to a peer, coordinating with a stranger while carrying heavy furniture up stairs: 
all involve many degrees of freedom.  Perhaps we should take a more complex 
dynamical model as our metaphor when considering the philosophical implications of 
embodied cognitive science. 
 
§3. A new metaphor: The MONIAC 
 
The field of analog computation studies complex, functional dynamical systems: the 
right sort of corral from which to wrangle a new metaphor for embodied cognition.3  
Most generally, an analog computer is a physical process functionally structured to 
constrain the relationship between continuously varying quantities. It is a computer in 
the sense that it realizes an effective procedure for transforming input values to output 
values that stand in a functionally specified relationship to its input and internal 
states.  It is analog in that it deals in quantities that vary continuously, rather than 
discretely.4   
 Mathematically, analog computers typically solve systems of differential 
equations.  Much as Turing (1936) broke digital computation down into a set of 																																																								3	The claim that cognition is analog computation has been defended before by other routes, for 
instance description of neural dynamics (Rubel, 1985) or top-down functional analysis (Shagrir, 2010).		4	It is important to stress that the quantities manipulated by an analog computer vary continuously 
from a physical perspective, as do weight, velocity, position, etc.  This does not imply that they are 
continuous in the mathematical sense, or that they admit the arbitrary degree of	specificity that can be 
found in a continuous mathematical object such as the real line.  Confusion on this point has resulted 
in much nonsense about hyper-Turing computation (Isaac, Szymanik, Verbrugge, 2014, 790; Piccinini, 
2015, 258–9, 271; c.f. §4.3).	
fundamental operations in order to analyze its mathematical properties, Claude 
Shannon (1941) offered a model of analog computation in terms of a different set of 
fundamental operations: addition of curves, multiplication by a constant, and 
(crucially) integration.5  Unlike digital computers, analog computers operate by 
physically simulating the desired functional relationships; for instance, in the 
Differential Analyzer, the particular computer inspiring Shannon, integration is 
performed by taking as input the motions of two variably rotating shafts u and a, 
representing functions of change over time, and constraining the motion of a third 
shaft to rotate at a rate varying as (𝑢 + 𝑎) 𝑑𝑡!!!  (338).  The physical relationship 
between the rates of rotation of input and output shafts is analogous to, and thereby 
simulates, the mathematical relationship between change in curvature and 
circumscribed area of the target functions.  For this reason, some presentations of 
analog computation emphasize not the continuous nature of the quantities involved, 
but rather the role of the system as an “analog” to the target of computation (e.g. 
Soroka, 1954). 
 There are many intuitive reasons to think analog computers might serve as an 
appropriate metaphor for embodied, enactive cognition.  Perhaps the most 
fundamental is that analog computers satisfy the same mathematics as the dynamical 
systems that inspired van Gelder, Chemero, and the enactivists, namely systems of 
differential equations.  Moreover, the theory of analog computation addresses the 
mechanical solution of differential equations with a very important constraint, namely 
that the solution procedure be effective, i.e. instantiable in a physical, real-world device 
that produces outcomes robust in the face of noise.  This is important, because 
dynamical processes may only be targets of evolutionary selection insofar as they can 
repeatedly and reliable generate an adaptive behavior, i.e. perform robustly in precisely 
this sense.  So, insofar as embodied cognition studies adaptive cognitive behavior, it 
should likewise restrict itself to positing mechanisms that exhibit this same robustness 
(c.f. §4.3).  Finally, analog computation constitutively relies on continuous dynamics 
and naturally implements homeostatic feedback loops, exactly the kind of qualitative 
features that have inspired the multi-E cognition movement. 
 Lets look at an example of a specific purpose analog computer: the “Phillips 
Machine,” more affectionately known as the MONIAC.  The MONIAC was 
designed to model the cyclic flow of income in an open market economy by Bill 
Phillips, NZ electrical engineer turned LSE sociology student.  He constructed the 
prototype in 1949, and its success earned him a lectureship at the London School of 
Economics; in the 1950s, Cambridge, Oxford, Manchester, Melbourne, Harvard, 
Chicago, the Ford Motor Company, and the Central Bank of Guatemala all 
purchased MONIACs.  The MONIAC allows users to visualize the dynamic effects 
of policy on money supply by watching changes in the flow and pooling of colored 
water pumped through a sequence of pellucid tubes and tanks.  (The water 
representing) income is pumped to the top of the machine, taxes funnelled off at the 
left, savings funnelled off at the right, then government expenditures and investment 
channelled back into the overall cascade of monetary flow, before expenses due to 
imports are funnelled off and, finally, income from exports flows back in to combine 																																																								5	One of the complexities of the study of analog computers is the variety of possible formalizations, 
without the same clear convergence as was found across the methods of Turing, Church, and Post for 
digital computation.  I gloss over these difficulties here.	
with the remainder in the “transaction balances” tank at the bottom (Fig. 2).  
Interactions between these values are controlled through a system of valves and gates, 
which may be adjusted to represent, e.g., different rates of taxation or saving.  
Likewise, different theories of qualitative features of the economy (e.g. Keynesian vs. 
classical economics) may be modeled by holding tank levels fixed or allowing them to 
vary freely.6 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Schematic diagram of the MONIAC (reproduced from Barr, 2000, with 
permission of Cambridge University Press). 																																																								6	This description draws heavily on Barr, 2000; see also Morgan, 2012, and Phillips, 1950.	
 
 
 The MONIAC was initially constructed as a teaching device; this explains 
Phillips’ decision to use the visually enthralling (but mechanically temperamental) 
flow of colored water to represent income, rather than, for instance, change of voltage 
in an electrical circuit.  Nevertheless, the operation of the MONIAC is precise 
enough to perform calculations (within a margin of ±4%), both of the effect of some 
policy intervention in establishing a new equilibrium between investment and 
expenditure, but also on the temporal trajectory of the change in monetary assets as 
the system transitions between equilibrium points.  Floats in each of the tanks are 
connected to pens that plot the time change trajectory in the corresponding value for 
both visualization and quantitative analysis.  Phillips’ official (1950) description of the 
machine managed to combine a presentation of its mechanics and construction with a 
rich analogical discussion of its implications for monetary theory, arguably “the first 
application of dynamic control theory to macroeconomics” (Barr, 2000, 95).   
 Is the MONIAC an analog computer?  Historians consider it a canonical 
instance of the genre (Bissell, 2007).  It satisfies the general definition given above in 
that it constrains physical quantities (rate of flow of water, volume of water in holding 
tanks, positions of valves, etc.) in order to realize functional relationships between 
their values.  Furthermore, it constrains these values by means of an effective 
procedure, bounded by an error margin of ±4%; within that bound, the performance 
of the machine is repeatable and robust.  The localized mechanical interactions of the 
MONIAC realize basic operations analogous to those studied by Shannon: 
combining streams (e.g. when investment flows into the central column) implements 
addition; valve diameter implements proportional multiplication (as increasing 
diameter is equivalent to multiplying flow by a larger constant); and operations 
functionally equivalent to integration are implemented by those structural features that 
ensure variance in output with change in rate of flow, for instance the timeplots of 
change in investments or imports, or the rate of investment itself, which a clever 
spring-operated counterbalance ensures varies with the rate of change in income. 
 So, the MONIAC is an analog computer, but is it the right sort of device to 
motivate intuitions about embodied cognition?  Above, I pointed out some general 
reasons to suspect enactive, embodied models of cognition are analogous to analog 
computers; one reason to consider the MONIAC in particular as a suggestive 
metaphor is that it was specifically designed to aid visualizability.  Thus, while a 
general purpose analog computer, such as the Differential Analyzer, may more nearly 
approach the complexity of a human brain than the MONIAC, it is nowhere near as 
easy to visualize qualitatively.  This easy visualizability ensures the MONIAC may 
serve as an effective prod to intuitions about analog computation.  Another reason to 
embrace the MONIAC as a model for embodied cognition is that it shares key 
features with the Watt Governor: both Governor and MONIAC are equilibrium 
systems, maintaining their equilibrium points through homeostatic feedback loops.  
Dynamic feedback loops are suggestive for enactive cognition since they de-
emphasize the boundary between cognitive system and world, highlighting instead 
the continuously fluctuating response by the agent to dynamic perturbations from the 
environment.  Likewise, in the MONIAC, one may easily interpret any of the side 
channels to and from a holding tank as the contribution of an external “environment” 
to the homeostatic mechanism of the rest of the device.7   
 While the MONIAC implements the same kind of homeostatic feedback 
loops we see in the Watt Governor, it maintains a much more precarious equilibrium 
point, affected by many more variables.  With this added complexity, come very 
different intuitions about the role of computation and representation in effective 
maintenance of dynamic equilibria.  In contrast to the Watt Governor, representation 
appears to play a constitutive role in explanations of the MONIAC; in particular, 
assignment of representational role to tanks, valves, and channels is critical for 
explaining their structural differences.  For instance, both the top and bottom tanks 
on the right have the same gross structural features, e.g. their levels may be held 
constant by linking them to an external storage tank.  However, one must interpret 
the top tank as representing savings, and the bottom one as representing foreign 
holdings, in order to understand or explain the differential significance for overall 
dynamics of this feature—in the former case, holding levels stable is equivalent to 
fixing the interest rate, in the latter case, it fixes exchange rate.  Moreover, 
recognizing these dynamics as instantiating a computation suggests a principled 
boundary between the functionally significant and the irrelevant aspects of 
performance; namely, only those features of the dynamics robust to fluctuations under 
4% of overall flow rate participate in computation.  
 This last point allows us to see why mere identification of system dynamics 
(pace the anti-representationalists) can never constitute a complete explanation of a 
computation-performing analog mechanism.  In a non-intentional dynamical system, 
such as global climate, no aspects of the system have privileged status—there is no 
difference in the type of explanation required for relatively stable features, such as 
mean rainfall in Chile’s Atacama Desert, versus manifestly chaotic ones, such as 
hurricane formation in the Gulf of Mexico.  It is this egalitarian quality which ensures 
that the differential equations which govern the system constitute a complete 
explanation of its behavior.  In contrast, in a dynamical system that computes, some 
values are privileged over others: those values the system strives to maintain in 
equilibrium play a different functional role than those it does not; fluctuations in the 
system above the threshold of noise are functionally significant, while those below it 
are not.  Correctly identifying these functional differences requires assigning a 
representational role to the values at stake, since only then can we assign correct 
functional role to the transformation or maintenance of these values.  At the very 
least, this implies that some parts of the system will be about other parts of the system, 
serving to represent, and perform transformations over, those internal states.8   
 As a final illustration of these claims, consider the curved wall of the “surplus 
balances” tank at the top right of the MONIAC.  The curvature of this wall ensures a 
particular functional relationship obtains between the volume and height of water in 
the tank, which in turn affects the rates of flow both in and out of the tank.  If the 																																																								7	Perhaps the most natural choice is the flow of import and export resources from the domestic portion 
of the model to the global economy.  Phillips himself suggested that two MONIACs might be linked 
through these channels to study the effects of import and export policy between two nations (1950, 
305).  In enactive terms, the contrast is analogous to that between the kind of feedback loop that 
maintains equilibrium with a stochastically stable environment, and that established when coordinating 
with other embodied agents, such as when playing jumprope or football.	8	This is the “internal semantics” of Piccinini, 2015.	
anti-representational account of dynamical systems explanation is correct, an adequate 
explanation of this part of the system would simply consist in the differential equation 
governing this relationship.  However, while such an equation would tell us what the 
curvature of the wall does—as might be adequate if this were a non-intentional system 
rather than a computer—, it would not tell us why the wall is curved, nor why the wall 
of the lower tank (in other respects, seemingly functionally very similar to the top 
tank) is not curved—the kind of understanding we demand of the MONIAC 
construed as a computational system.  This difference can be explained by observing 
that the curve represents the functional relationship posited in Keynesian economics 
between the preference for liquidity, i.e. money available for immediate transactions, 
and the interest rate.  It ensures the height of water in the tank is inversely 
proportional to, and thus serves as a measure of, interest rate.  Likewise, the height of 
water in the lower tank measures the exchange rate; yet there is no analogous 
relationship between flow of money in and out of a domestic economy and anything 
corresponding to a notion of liquidity preference at the international scale.  Only by 
going beyond mere description of temporal dynamics to an identification of 
represented values and represented functional relationships, are we able to adequately 
explain these features of the MONIAC.  
 
§4. Some morals for embodied cognition 
 
The previous discussion emphasized the reactionary consequences of taking the 
MONIAC as a metaphor for embodied, enactive cognition: pace the “radical” view, 
embodied, enactive cognition is computational, and thus appropriately conceptualized 
as transformations over representations.  Nevertheless, embracing the metaphor of 
analog computation does have some striking “revolutionary” implications for cognitive 
science; here I’ll briefly survey only three: representations are kinematic, simulations 
are ineliminable, and computability constrains functional analysis. 
 
§4.1. Representation: Kinematic and architectural, not static and symbolic 
 
Explanations of the MONIAC appeal to representations, and the complexity of the 
system implies that it cannot be adequately understood or explained without these 
representational ascriptions.  Nevertheless, the vehicles of representation in the 
MONIAC are radically different from the vehicles of representation in a digital 
computer.   
 Digital computation is defined over an alphabet of discrete symbols.  Each 
symbol represents only in virtue of some conventional interpretation, or assignment of 
content—‘1’ may be assigned the interpretation one, but it could just as easily be used 
to signify zero, the command erase RAM, or the person Richard Nixon.  Symbols are 
static objects, and they suggest the characteristic transformations identified by Turing, 
namely they may be read or written to tape. 
 In contrast, representations in an analog system are typically kinematic, that is, 
movement or change in some quantity measures or represents change in some other 
quantity.  No fixed amount of water in the MONIAC represents anything, but the 
kinematics of hydraulic flow do perform representational functions.  Change in rate of 
flow represents change in rate of monetary circulation; change in height of surplus 
balances tank represents change in interest rate, etc.9  These kinematic representations 
contrast with symbolic representations not only in the form of their vehicles, but also 
in the nature of their content: symbols most naturally represent objects or properties, 
while kinematic changes most naturally represent quantities, values that fall within a 
spectrum of possibilities, or scale.  A moral for embodied cognition is to think of 
mental representations as analogous to measurements, as the theory of measurement 
provides the canonical account of the representation of quantities.10  
 A second form of representation in the MONIAC might be called 
architectural: aspects of its arrangement or physical structure represent mathematical 
relationships between kinematically represented quantities.  The curvature of the wall 
of the surplus balances tank discussed above is one such structural feature.  The value 
of interpreting these as representations of mathematical relations rather than merely 
instantiations of them is that these architectural features are subject to correctness 
conditions.  If the outer wall of the surplus balances tank is bent over time, through 
mechanical wear and tear, then it will come to misrepresent Keynes’ theory of the 
relationship between liquidity preference and interest rate, and thus computations 
with the MONIAC that assume Keynes’ theory may be incorrect.   
 
§4.2. Explanation: Models, not modules 
 
One feature of dynamical models that has been stressed before, and which is vividly 
illustrated by the MONIAC, is their holistic character.  While the classical digital 
metaphor suggested cognition be thought of as modular, or comprising 
informationally encapsulated sub-routines (Fodor, 1983), the dynamical, enactive 
approach suggests all features of the system are entangled in webs of mutual influence 
and interaction (Anderson, Richardson, and Chemero, 2012).  One implication of 
holism is that simulation may play an ineliminable role in explanations of complex 
cognitive capacities 
 This holistic character of complex dynamical systems, and the corresponding 
explanatory importance of simulations, is nicely illustrated by one of the theoretical 
contributions of the MONIAC: deflation of the dispute between Keynes and 
Robertson over the determination of interest rates.  Keynes argued that interest rates 
are determined by the preference for liquidity, i.e. for holding money rather than 
bonds, while Robertson argued that interest rate is determined by the demand for 
loanable funds, i.e. the differential “flow of saving versus that of investment” (Morgan, 
2012, 209).  In Phillips’ words, participants in the debate “suffered through lack of a 
suitable technique for showing the process of change through time of the inter-related 
factors” (1950, 299).  Essentially, Keynes and Robertson were each describing part of 
the economic dynamics in isolation, and this piecemeal approach obscured the 
elaborate interaction between these respective parts.  The MONIAC, by instantiating 
both theories in a single system demonstrates they are “neither inconsistent with each 																																																								9	We can see now why van Gelder could not find representations of the static sort in the Watt 
Governor.  Considered as an analog computer, we should not expect any particular, fixed feature of the 
Governor, such as the angle of the arms, to do representational work.  If any aspect of the system 
represents, it should do so kinematically—for instance change in the angle of the arms, or rate of 
change, are more appropriate candidate representations. 10	For an extended discussion of how perceptual representations in particular are analogous to 
measurements, see Isaac, 2014.	
other . . ., nor merely different ways of saying the same thing . . ., but are 
complementary parts of a wider system” (299).  This dispute, and its resolution by the 
MONIAC, also nicely illustrates again why differential equations by themselves may 
not be enough to sufficiently explain a dynamical system.  The further ingredient here 
is an understanding of the dynamics the separate equations jointly determine, and in 
the case of the interest rate debate this understanding was imparted through the 
explicit, visually accessible, ostension of those dynamics in the MONIAC.11   
 The constitutive role of models and simulations in the explanations of 
embodied cognitive science has been emphasized before, but suggested as further 
evidence against the explanatory value of representation attribution (e.g. Chemero, 
2012, 99–101).  A much-discussed example, for instance, is the HKB model of the 
synchronization of bilateral finger motion (Haken, Kelso, and Bunz, 1985).  This 
model takes the transitions of finger wagging in and out of phase as a consequence of 
the nonlinear coupling of self-sustaining oscillators, reducing the change in phase 𝜙 to 
a function of two parameters, which may be fit to observed system dynamics: 
 𝑉(𝜙) = −𝑎 cos𝜙 − 𝑏 cos 2𝜙 
 
No part of the model need be explained in representational terms, yet the close 
replication of the phase-shifting patterns observed in finger wagging experiments it 
produces lends it credence as an explanation.  Oscillators coupled in accordance with 
this model characteristically exhibit spontaneous changes in relative phase, preceded 
by an increase in system entropy.  Chemero argues that this general pattern is 
observed in, and thus extensions of this model explain, a variety of more complex 
phenomena, including synchronization across movements of other limbs, metrical 
phenomena in speech, and the “a-ha” moment that occurs when a subject switches to 
a new mode of problem solving (2012, 85–96).    
 Like the Watt Governor, however, the HKB model is extremely simple, and 
one might wonder whether non-representational models of this form can really “scale 
up” to account for complex cognitive behavior.  The recommendation here is that 
scaling up will require much more elaborate models, which, though comprising 
qualitatively similar components, will typically demand a representational 
interpretation, on pain of failure to impart understanding.  Nevertheless, pace 
traditional computationalism, mere identification of representational content and 
functional relationships between vehicles will likewise not, in general, be sufficient for 
an explanation—this follows from the inherently holistic, non-modular nature of 
cross-coupling within a dynamical system, even one performing a computation.  
Rather, the model must also be implemented in a simulation if its complex dynamics 
are to be fully understood.  The general moral for embodied, enactive cognitive 
science, then, is that running of simulations and identifying representations are 
complementary, rather than exclusionary, steps in the construction of full-fledged 
explanations. 
 
 																																																								11	As Morgan (2012) recounts, this point was crystal clear to the audience at Phillips’ first, 1949, 
demonstration of the MONIAC at the LSE, while Robertson himself, having not seen the machine in 
person, seemed unable to grasp it from the paper alone (209).	
§4.3. Analog vs. Turing computability 
 
If a system is a computer, then it implements an effective procedure, i.e. one that 
requires only finite physical resources and robustly returns the same result on 
repetition.  Computability theory analyzes effective procedures in terms of the 
(mathematical) functions they may compute.  So, if cognition is analog computation, 
it consists only in functions (isomorphic to those) that are analog-computable, and 
thus the mathematical theory of analog computation should constrain and inform 
explanations in embodied cognitive science. 
 One project in the mathematics of analog computation investigates “effective” 
operations defined over mathematically continuous domains, e.g. the real line, and 
argues that these include non-Turing-computable functions, such as the halting 
problem, thus instantiating hyper-Turing computation (e.g. Siegelmann, 2003).  
More generally from this perspective, analogs to the key notions for Turing 
computability over integers (e.g. recursive functions, decidability, the complexity 
hierarchy12) may be defined for analog computation over reals (Blum, Shub, and 
Smale, 1989).   
 However, any real world analog device will be subject to systemic low-level 
noise—in the MONIAC, for instance, noise manifests as fluctuations in the 
movement of water at a scale smaller than the precision bound on valves and 
channels—, and thus procedures that are effective in reality cannot access the full 
precision of the reals.  Consequently, although analog computers solve differential 
equations, and differential equations are typically defined over real numbers, the 
solutions delivered by realistic analog computers are at best approximations to real-
valued solutions.  This principled limit on the mathematical resolution of any 
particular analog computer is called by Vergis, Steiglitz, and Dickinson (1986) its 
“absolute precision, 𝜀”: 
 
[T]he solution obtained from [an analog computer] does not change when the 
physical variables range over an 𝜀-neighborhood of their nominal values. . . . 
In order to discuss the operation of physical devices using mathematical 
models, it is important to insure that the models are robust in the sense that 
the physical behavior predicted by the mathematical model is not more 
sensitive to small changes in the model than is the underlying physical system 
to small perturbations. (94) 
 
Consequently, if we are to investigate the properties of realistic analog computers 
mathematically, we need to include the bound on precision 𝜀 in our mathematical 
model of the device.  Given a mathematical model of realistic analog computers such 
as this, one may ask whether they are computationally equivalent to realistic digital 
computers (i.e. those modeled by Turing machines with bounded tape length).  If so, 
then it would constitute a further confirmation of the Church-Turing thesis and 
constrain cognitive explanations to only include Turing computable functions.  
Personally, I’m inclined to think this is the likely result, but the technical issues here 																																																								12	See, e.g., Cutland, 1980, for the basics of Turing computability and equivalent models, and Li and 
Vitányi, 2003, for a thorough introduction to computational complexity theory.	
are subtle and, as yet, not a matter of consensus.  Nevertheless, we can still consider 
hypothetical implications of this line of research for embodied cognitive science. 
 Suppose it turns out that realistic analog computation is not only Turing 
equivalent, but that the coarse complexity classes of analog computation are 
equivalent to those of digital computation, i.e. problems that are NP-hard for digital 
computers (intuitively, those with no efficient, or “shortcut” solutions) may likewise 
only be solved inefficiently by analog computers; call this the Complexity-Matching 
Thesis (CMT).  Vergis, Steiglitz, and Dickinson (1986) explicitly defend CMT, and it 
follows for the special case of cognition from Rubel’s (1985) conjecture that brains 
utilize the all-or-none character of nervous activity to “digitally simulate” analog 
computations.  A novel research program for embodied cognition could arise from 
combining the CMT and the P-Cognition Thesis (PCT, van Rooij, 2008), namely the 
posit that all cognitive operations are tractable, or computable in polynomial-time.  
For instance, if an enactivist model of some cognitive task is intractable, then CMT 
plus PCT implies the task analysis is incorrect, and the brain must actually be 
computing some simpler, more tractable function.13  Conversely, and more 
interestingly, suppose it turns out that CMT is false, and that the complexity 
hierarchy of analog computations is not equivalent to the standard hierarchy.  Then 
embracing PCT opens a new realm for the empirical comparison of embodied and 
classical models; for instance, if a traditional analysis of a putative cognitive task is 
(Turing) untractable, but an embodied analysis of the same task is (analog) tractable, 
the embodied analysis should be preferred.   
 Finally, even in the absence of specific results, computability considerations 
may substantively inform the interpretation of embodied models of cognition.  
Specifically, the constraint that computations be effective procedures implies that only 
dynamical behavior robust in the face of low-level noise is properly cognitive.  
Consider, for instance, the HKB model discussed above: does the phase-switching 
behavior of the model depend on arbitrarily small fluctuations in the system dynamics, 
or is it robust to low-level noise?  If the former, then the behavior it models is not 
computational, and thus also not cognitive.  More generally, for any putative instance 
of embodied cognition, one may ask whether it constitutes an effective procedure or 
not, and if not, it would seem to be an artifact of contingent features of the system 
dynamics, rather than a true cognitive capacity.  This returns us to the consideration 
raised at the start of §2: if one assumes that cognitive capacities are adaptive, then 
they must also be robust to noise, i.e. constitute effective procedures.  This follows 
from the observation that selective pressures cannot target one-off events; in order to 
be a target for natural selection a capacity or feature must be inheritable, and thus it 
must in some sense be robustly repeatable. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The Watt Governor is too simplistic a model to spawn convincing intuitions about 
embodied, enactive cognition.  I suggest analog computers may serve as a better 
metaphor for multi-E cognitive science, and offer the MONIAC as a highly 
suggestive and easily visualizable exemplar.  From this perspective, embodied, enactive 																																																								13	For an extended survey and discussion of this method of reasoning in the context of traditional 
cognitive science, see Isaac, Szymanik, and Verbrugge, 2014.	
cognitive science is consistent with computationalism, understood as the thesis that 
cognition comprises transformations over representations.  Nevertheless, embracing 
an analog computation account of cognition has revolutionary consequences: 
representations should be understood as kinematic or architectural, explanations may 
constitutively involve simulations, and the mathematics of analog computability and 
complexity should constrain and inform the construction of embodied explanations. 
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